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An Empirical Investigation of Ex Post Transaction Costs  
in Franchised Distribution Channels 
 
ABSTRACT 
This study focuses on organizational efforts to constrain ex post transaction costs in 
interorganizational exchange.  The theoretical model frames opportunism as a determinant of 
transaction costs and implicates cooperation and formalization as control structures that alleviate 
opportunism.  The model also examines whether the proposed theoretical relationships are 
enduring.  Franchisee-franchisor relationships in the Norwegian distribution system of a 
multinational oil refiner provided the context for analysis.  A test of the model using  
multi-sample data across two time periods indicates that opportunistic behavior consistently 
increases transaction costs.  Furthermore, cooperative interaction curbs bargaining costs and 
formalization reduces opportunism.  Implications for interorganizational theory and franchising 
management are discussed.
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 Transaction cost analysis offers compelling logic for evaluating the efficacy of exchange 
in alternative governance structures.  Prior transaction cost research offers substantial insight 
into the design of governance mechanisms (Williamson 1996b), yet few empirical efforts have 
examined whether these governance mechanisms influence channel outcomes.  If the theory is to 
be informative to researchers and managers of organizational networks, research must illustrate 
the extent to which governance mechanisms influence multiple facets of transaction costs. 
The goal of this study is to gain an understanding of interorganizational antecedents to 
transaction costs.  The link between organizational control and performance is outlined in 
transaction cost analysis (Williamson 1990) and control theory (Ouchi 1979), yet empirical 
research has rarely analyzed the association between organizational control and performance 
(Rindfleisch and Heide 1997).  Eisenhardt (1985) provides evidence to suggest that task 
programmability, behavioral measures, and costs of outcome-based evaluation foster salaried-
based compensation.  Anderson (1988) indicates that firms with dedicated investments in 
volatile markets integrate channel partners to raise efficiency.  Similarly, Noordewier, John, and 
Nevin (1990) illustrate how norms lower logistical costs when environmental uncertainty is high.   
In long-term contractual alliances, geographic distance, legal constraints, and local market 
characteristics often make integration infeasible or undesirable (Brickley and Dark 1987).  In 
addition, integration impairs incentive structures and complicates cost allocations (Williamson 
1985).  Management must therefore develop other means by which to enhance performance.  We 
illustrate how organizational efforts to alleviate opportunism yield lower transaction costs.  
Organizational efforts to constrain opportunism have been examined by several authors (e.g., John 
1984; Stump and Heide 1996), yet these studies have not considered whether transaction costs are 
lowered as opportunism is constrained.  We frame opportunism as a determinant of multiple facets 
of transaction costs, and we implicate interfirm cooperation and formalization as control structures 
that alleviate opportunism.  Examination of cooperation underscores interpersonal processes that 
management should monitor to enhance performance.  In addition, analysis of formalization 
provides insight into action that management can take to raise productivity. 
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 Our analysis of antecedents to transaction costs examines whether the influences of control 
structures and opportunism are enduring.  Transaction cost theory has not characterized how 
specific relationships develop, and related survey-based research (e.g., John 1984) has relied on 
data gathered at a single point in time.  By contrast, we track relationships in the Norwegian 
distribution network of a multinational oil refiner over a five-year period.  We test the model with 
an initial data set and also evaluate the theoretical framework with an exact replication (Sawyer and 
Peter 1983).  The design facilitates assessment of static relationships in the model while also 
evaluating changes in theoretical relationships (Menard 1981).  Dynamic mapping of organizational 
properties provides an opportunity to make strategic interventions with confidence (Kimberly 
1976).  Nevertheless, longitudinal methods have rarely been incorporated into interfirm research 
(Anderson 1995). 
 The paper proceeds as follows.  We initially present a model of organizational 
antecedents to transaction costs.  The method and data collection procedures are then described 
followed by the measures and data analyses.  In the final section we discuss implications of our 
study for interfirm management and research. 
 
MODEL AND HYPOTHESES 
 
 Transaction costs are expenditures associated with an economic exchange that vary 
independently of competitive prices and the product exchanged (Robins 1987).  After an 
agreement is established, parties to a contract face bargaining, monitoring, and maladaption costs 
(Williamson 1985, p. 21).  Our model (see Figure 1) of antecedents to transaction costs 
underscores the central importance of opportunism to transaction costs.  Opportunism refers to 
self-interest seeking behavior embodied in calculated efforts to mislead and confuse trading 
partners (Williamson 1985, p. 47).  Most analyses of channel opportunism (e.g., Anderson 1988) 
focus on the opportunistic inclinations of agents.  By contrast, our study addresses the actions of 
principals.  Franchise relationships are subject to moral hazard on the part of the franchisor as 
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 well as the franchisee (Lal 1990), yet research has rarely considered the opportunistic 
inclinations of franchisors (cf. Agarwal and Lal 1995; Lafontaine 1992).  For example, 
franchisors are opportunistic when they develop national promotional campaigns for products 
but fail to ship appropriate quantities of the product to franchises.  When franchisees are 
subjected to franchisor opportunism, higher transaction costs should obtain.  Consider how 
franchisor opportunism influences ex post transaction costs.  
____________________________________ 
 
Figure 1 about here. 
____________________________________ 
 
Bargaining Costs.  Bargaining costs are expenditures associated with negotiation between 
transacting parties (Milgrom and Roberts 1991).  Environmental contingencies and new market 
information pose threats to static relationships.  Consequently, parties to long-term agreements 
periodically negotiate to modify contractual terms, add sources of supply, and otherwise enhance 
contracts.  Franchisees establish long-term agreements with franchisors, but bargaining costs are 
not eliminated due to these contracts.  For example, parties to franchise agreements negotiate over 
order quantities and delivery schedules.  Franchisor opportunism should substantially complicate 
bargaining over these issues.  Franchisors with strong inclinations to act opportunistically dedicate 
considerable efforts to the enhancement of their bargaining positions.  Franchisees must devote 
more energy to the development of proposals that decrease the likelihood that they are subjected 
to opportunism.  Contracts must incorporate sanctions and safeguards that limit the liabilities 
incurred as a consequence of dealing with opportunistic trading partners.  Thus, we hypothesize: 
H1: Franchisor opportunism is positively associated 
with franchisee bargaining costs. 
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 Monitoring costs.  These costs are expenditures made to guarantee the fulfillment of contractual 
obligations.  Monitoring costs are incurred to ensure that trading partners act in the best interest of 
the channel (Lal 1990).  For example, petroleum retailers assess the timeliness of franchisor 
deliveries as well as the quality of products delivered by the franchisor.  In franchised systems it is 
critical to ensure that trading partners do not shirk contractual responsibilities (Fama and Jensen 
1983).  In oil franchising the franchisee is not granted credit for deliveries of oil-related products 
and must make payment upon delivery.  As a consequence, the dealer dedicates effort to ensure 
that shipments are accurate and timely.  Payment for undelivered goods lowers the franchisee’s 
profitability, and untimely deliveries increase the cost to assess the veracity of shipments.  
Franchisor opportunism should have a strong influence on these monitoring costs.  As the 
franchisor becomes more prone to miscreant behavior, the franchisee must devise and implement 
controls to guarantee the fulfillment of contractual obligations.  In addition, as the franchisor 
becomes more devious in interactions with the franchisee, the franchisee is inclined to dedicate 
more time to oversee shipments and deliveries.  Therefore, we offer the following hypothesis: 
H2:  Franchisor opportunism is positively associated  
with franchisee monitoring costs.  
 
Maladaption Costs.  These costs are embodied in communication and coordination failures between 
parties to a contract (Reve 1986).  Maladaption costs arise when the information needed to 
merchandise and sell products does not accompany deliveries.  These costs also accrue when the 
information is too voluminous or incomplete to be useful to the manager.  In contrast to the 
opportunity costs accrued when decision making is sub-optimal, trading partners incur these costs 
when they dedicate efforts to ensure that information is complete and accurate (Williamson 1985).  
For example, the franchisor may have an opportunity to make telephone calling cards available for 
sale at franchised outlets.  The franchisor may offer the products for sale in the retail outlets without 
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 providing the franchisee with instructions regarding the use and sale of the product.  The franchisor 
benefits from incentives associated with a substantial purchase of calling cards, but the franchisee 
has difficulty selling the product.  The franchisee incurs costs due to the opportunistic 
recommendations of the franchisor.  Thus, the following is proposed: 
H3: Franchisor opportunism is positively associated  
with franchisee maladaption costs.  
 
Our model of antecedents to transaction costs focuses on the mitigating role of 
opportunism.  Although control theory suggests that control structures yield higher marketing 
performance for organizational sub-units (cf. Ruekert, Walker, and Roering 1985), transaction 
costs analysis emphasizes the mitigating influence of opportunism.  In the absence of 
opportunism, coordination of exchange can be accomplished largely through self-enforcing 
general clause agreements.  As franchise relationships mature, however, franchisees develop 
specialized knowledge of local markets and financial power (Llewelyn 1931).  These franchisees 
must safeguard investments from the miscreant behavior of the franchisor (Williamson 1993).  
Interfirm cooperation and formalization serve as control mechanisms that influence franchisor 
opportunism.  Interfirm cooperation refers the extent to which the principal and agent coordinate 
strategies for marketing the branded concept in the agent’s trade area (Reve 1980)1.  To varying 
degrees, franchisors and franchisees interact to make decisions regarding advertising, sales 
campaigns, and store layouts.  This interaction is critical to the maintenance and development of 
the interorganizational relationship (Young and Wilkinson 1989). 
Management-initiated, formal control mechanisms operate in conjunction with informal 
mechanisms to yield desired outcomes (Jaworski 1988).  Although franchisees provide input into 
enhancements of formal policies (cf. Ring and Van de Ven 1994; Bradach 1997), these control 
structures are crafted by the franchisor.  Thus, our model treats formalization as a franchisor-
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 based mechanism implemented to guide franchisor and franchisee behavior.  Formalization 
refers to the extent to which rules and procedures govern the relationship between 
interorganizational partners (Van de Ven 1976).  Franchised relationships are established via 
written contracts (Keating 1991), and explicit procedures identify the duties and responsibilities 
of both parties to the contract.  Nevertheless, the extent to which relationships rely on clearly 
defined routines varies within a distribution network (John 1984; Dwyer and Oh 1987).  
Reve and Stern (1986) present alternative hypotheses concerning the role of these control 
mechanisms.  Citing sociological theory of power and dependence (e.g., Emerson 1962; Cook 
1977), they maintain that power wielding creates negative sentiments and fosters retaliatory 
behavior.  By contrast, they reference institutional economics (Williamson 1975) to argue that 
hierarchical organization— notably characterized by cooperation and formalization— fosters 
convergent expectations and satisfactory trading environments.  Reve and Stern’s (1986) empirical 
treatment of cooperation and formalization is largely supportive of the transaction cost framework.  
Their analysis of Norwegian distribution channels indicates that principals and agents who 
cooperatively interact to develop market strategies are likely to establish convergent goals (Reve 
and Stern 1986).  When the objectives of franchisor and franchisee are convergent, the likelihood of 
committing opportunistic acts should diminish (Anderson 1988).  Thus, John (1984) and Dwyer and 
Oh (1987) indicate that participative decision making is negatively associated with opportunism. 
Operating policies are developed to ensure that the franchised system is successfully 
implemented, yet franchises may react positively or negatively to these policies (Stern, El-
Ansary, and Coughlan 1996).  The rationale from power and dependence theory, which suggests 
that the wielding of power encourages retaliation, is supported by research by John (1984) and 
Provan and Skinner (1989).  In both of these studies formalization was found to enhance 
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 opportunism.  By contrast, the transaction cost notion that hierarchical control enhances the 
trading atmosphere is supported by Dwyer and Oh’s (1987) research in automobile channels.   
To gain an understanding of the influence of formalization on opportunism one must 
consider the nature of formalization in the channel.  Scott (1987, p. 33) maintains that formalization 
refers to the degree to which rules prescribing behavior are formulated as well as the extent to 
which role responsibilities are prescribed.  Directives that explicitly identify appropriate interfirm 
behaviors tend to exacerbate the level of opportunism.  For example, John (1984) suggests that 
franchisor-induced procedures lead to erosion of the relationship and result in higher levels of agent 
opportunism (cf. Provan and Skinner 1989).  By contrast, formalization that identifies 
complementary tasks and responsibilities should illuminate the convergent goals of exchange 
partners (cf. Gupta, Raj, and Wilemon 1987).  Consistent with this perspective, Dwyer and Oh 
(1987) maintain that formalization of responsibility guards against the capricious mobilization of 
power.  Specific descriptions of obligations highlight the complementary responsibilities and 
objectives of buyers and sellers (Reve 1980).  Formal policies that recognize complementary 
responsibilities should make opportunism less desirable.  Therefore, the following are proposed: 
H4a: Interfirm cooperation is negatively associated with franchisor 
opportunism. 
 
H4b: Formalized procedures and role responsibilities are 
negatively associated with franchisor opportunism. 
 
Temporal Constraints on Theoretical Relationships 
 Transaction costs analysis recognizes that the pursuit of efficiency is a dynamic process that 
evolves over multiple periods of interaction.  Nevertheless, theory has not explicated how specific 
theoretical relationships emerge over time.  In this section we offer preliminary hypotheses that 
examine whether the relationships outlined in H1-H4 are enduring.  Our analysis of time-based 
8 
 
 constraints presumes stability of marketplace conditions (Duncan 1972; Lawrence and Lorsch 
1986). 
Bargaining Costs.  Negotiation research provides insight into the on-going influence of franchisor 
opportunism on bargaining costs.  Laboratory experiments involving repeated negotiation indicate 
that individuals who consistently bear the consequences of opportunism begin to recognize the 
direction the interaction is taking (Rubin and Brown 1975).  These individuals begin to favor 
competitive interaction over mutual problem solving (Pruitt 1981).  Consequently, the level of 
opportunism escalates (Pruitt and Rubin 1986), and the returns from the interaction degrade 
(Axelrod 1984).  Franchise litigation also supports an on-going relationship between opportunism 
and bargaining costs.  For example, in Eastridge vs. Shell Oil Company (1985), the franchisor acted 
with malfeasance when it refused to accept a qualified potential buyer of a service station.  The 
franchisee consequently made eleven additional attempts to sell the station to prospective 
franchisees.  The franchisor’s pattern of opportunism had an enduring influence on the franchisee’s 
bargaining costs.  Similar results should obtain in franchise relationships that have not escalated to 
litigation.  Franchisees that interact with miscreant franchisors yield less effective bargaining 
sessions and dedicate efforts to ensure that negotiation sessions are productive.  By contrast, trading 
partners that develop positive bonds establish a mutual problem-solving environment in which it is 
less necessary to ensure that appropriate returns accrue.  When divergence of goals and 
opportunism are consistently low, on-going bargaining costs should also be low (Pratt and 
Zeckhauser 1985).  Therefore, the following is proposed: 
H5:  Franchisor opportunism has an enduring positive influence on 
franchisee bargaining costs. 
 
Monitoring Costs.  Prolonged interaction provides the opportunity to assess whether a trading 
partner’s action has jeopardized performance (Arrow 1985).  Consistent interaction with 
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 opportunistic trading partners yields poor performance, and measures must be put in place to 
constrain trading partners from acting opportunistically (Radner 1981).  Trading partners that 
consistently commit miscreant acts develop reputations for opportunism, and corrective 
measures are implemented to monitor the action of the trading partner (Wilson 1985).  For 
example, in Brown vs. Gillen (1989), Brown established a reputation for malfeasance through 
untimely deliveries of gasoline, negligent repairs of facilities, and overcharges for petroleum 
products.  Consequently, Gillen incurred substantial costs to maintain operations of the retail 
service station.  Consistent supplier opportunism results in on-going efforts to monitor the 
exchange relationship. Therefore, the following is proposed: 
H6:  Franchisor opportunism has an enduring positive influence on 
franchisee monitoring costs. 
 
Maladaption Costs.  Individuals that interact with deceptive channel partners continue to incur 
costs associated with the untimely and confusing presentation of information.  The initial 
recognition of opportunism necessitates expenditures to ensure that interfirm communications 
have been accurate and complete (Milgrom and Roberts 1990).  Trading partners that have been 
the target of opportunism cannot ignore the history of the relationships, and they must devise 
mechanisms to evaluate whether future communications are timely and complete (Aoki 1994).  
For example, Jiffy-Lube established a program in which fleet customers paid the franchisor for 
services rendered at franchisee outlets (Jiffy-Lube vs. Weiss Brothers 1993).  The franchisor 
compensated the franchisee in the form of credits after deducting for royalties and processing 
costs.  Franchisees viewed the franchisor’s mechanisms for determining credits as opportunistic.  
Moreover, the franchisees incurred on-going costs associated with the poor formulation and 
untimely reporting of credit information.  Franchisor opportunism had an enduring influence on 
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 the franchisees’ costs to acquire and assess timely interfirm communications.  Thus, the 
following is proposed: 
H7: Franchisor opportunism has an enduring positive influence on 
franchisee maladaption costs. 
 
Opportunism.  Control structures enable trading partners to constrain the level of opportunism 
operating in a channel.  On-going cooperation coalesces the objectives of buyer and seller and 
establishes an environment in which neither party benefits from opportunism (cf. Commons 
1990).  For example, over several decades A.O. Smith and General Motors have worked together 
to design and test auto body frames, re-tool production facilities, and train employees (Coase 
1988).  Many facets of the relationship are not governed by formal agreements, yet the on-going 
interaction enables the firms to constrain opportunism.  Similarly, Bradach (1997) indicates that 
cooperative interaction enables management of quick-service restaurant systems to hold in check 
the number of violations to the interfirm agreement.  On-going cooperation underscores the 
value of the relationship and thus makes opportunism less likely. 
Consistent emphasis on rules and procedures should also have an enduring effect on 
opportunism.  Formal procedures developed in prior periods establish expected activities among 
participants to an exchange (Commons 1990).  Thus, Pittman’s (1991) analysis of rail contracts 
indicates that contractual responsibilities and obligations ensure that neither rail shippers nor 
railroads are subjected to opportunism from their respective partners.  Successive attempts to 
delineate and refine role obligations should continually discourage opportunism (Milgrom and 
Roberts 1990).  For example, a franchise system may receive quantity rebates from a vendor.  The 
franchisor’s failure to pass these savings on to franchisees is viewed as an act of malfeasance.  
Franchisees will initially request policies to ensure payment, but over time these directives 
become more detailed in their specification of rebate periods, order quantities, return policies, and 
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 reimbursement schedules for franchisor payments.  Formal policies are continually implemented 
and refined in order to constrain opportunism.  Therefore, the following are proposed: 
H8a:  Interfirm cooperation has an enduring negative influence on 
franchisor opportunism. 
 
H8b:  Formal rules and procedures have an enduring negative 
influence on franchisor opportunism. 
 
METHOD 
 
Empirical Context 
 
 The empirical setting for this research is the Norwegian oil industry.  Our hypotheses are 
developed under the assumption that the market is relatively stable over the 1990-1994 period.  
Industrial conditions and macro-market factors derived from records of the Norwegian Petroleum 
Institute (e.g., Norsk Petroleuminstitutt 1995) and the Norwegian Bureau of Statisitics (Statistisk 
Sentralbyrå 1995) indicate that energy production and petroleum prices are stable over the period2.  
The macro-market conditions are also suggestive of a slow-growing economy.  Over the 1990-
1994 period the inflation and unemployment rates are relatively low and stable.  The GNP growth 
rate and surplus supply of goods and services are also relatively stable and increasing. 
Sampling Procedure and Data Collection 
 Our sampling frame was the Norwegian distribution network of a multinational oil 
company.  The first data set was collected in 1990.  We mailed surveys to 299 retailers and 
received 179 completed responses (61% response rate).  We also sent surveys to the refiner’s 
area sales managers responsible for coordinating activities with the retailers.  The refiner 
employed twenty-three area sales managers to monitor franchisee operations in Norway.  
Because each manager supervised the operations of ten to twenty stations in the network, it was 
not feasible for them to report on each station.  Seventy-five service stations were selected at 
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 random for analysis, and area sales managers provided data on 72 outlets (96% response rate).  
The follow-up data were collected in 1994 in the same distribution network.  Two hundred 
sixteen responses were received from the 432 managers (50% response rate) in the network.   
The sampling procedure was uniform for the two data collection periods.  Mail surveys 
were sent to the retail mangers along with appeals for participation from the refiner, the retail 
managers’ union, and the project leader.  The managers received two telephone calls requesting 
their participation in the study.  In both phases of data collection comparisons were made 
between early and late responses on ancillary issues (e.g., retail experience) and all constructs in 
the model (Armstrong and Overton 1977).  None of the tests was significant, which suggests that 
non-response is not an issue. 
Measure Development 
 
 Measure development was based on the procedure outlined by Churchill (1979) and 
updated by Gerbing and Anderson (1988).  Items were generated based on four interviews with 
officials in the distribution network (2 retail managers, 1 area sales manager, and the corporate 
distribution manager) and reviews of related distribution literature.  A pre-test of the survey 
instrument was then administered to five retail managers.  The pilot study confirmed that retail 
managers were appropriate informants for the study and also indicated that secondary informants 
were not available at retail sites.  Although multiple informants facilitate isolation of informant 
bias (Kumar, Stern, and Anderson 1993), multiple informants were not available in this setting. 
 Consistent with the dyadic approach developed by Anderson and Weitz (1992), we used 
parallel wording for the retailer and sales manager reports.  For example, the English translation of 
one formalization measure for the retailer survey read “There is no clear distribution of tasks 
between us and (the refiner).”  The complementary item from the area sales manager instrument 
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 read “There is no clear distribution of tasks between us and the dealer.”  Coefficient alpha, item-
to-total correlation analysis, and exploratory factor analysis were used to purify the scales.  The 
factor analysis procedure was estimated using matched dyads (n=72) from the retailer and sales 
manager reports in the 1990 data.  Items were eliminated from both surveys that did not load 
properly in either factor analytic procedure.  With the exception of the formalization scale (α = 
.63) most scales exceed the acceptance criterion for basic research (Nunnally 1978).  Although the 
bivariate correlation coefficient for the follow-up measure of bargaining costs is modest (.65), it 
parallels prior two-item measures in channels research (e.g., Dant and Schul 1992). 
Measures 
 
Bargaining Costs.  This construct refers to franchisee perceptions of the extent to which 
negotiations are systematic and effective (Milgrom and Roberts 1991).  A two-item Likert-type 
scale was developed to address this issue. 
Monitoring costs.  These costs refer to franchisee expenditures of time and other resources 
necessary to assess the quality and quantity of deliveries from the refiner to retailer.  This cost 
factor was measured via three Likert-type items. 
Maladaption Costs.  Maladaption costs are expenses associated with deciphering information 
provided by a trading partner (Reve 1986).  A three-item Likert-type scale addressed this issue.  
Interfirm cooperation.  Cooperation refers the extent to which principal and agent coordinate 
strategies for marketing the branded concept in the agent’s trade area (Reve 1980).  Five Likert-
type items were adapted from Reve and Stern’s (1986) measure of vertical interaction. 
Formalization.  Formalization addresses the extent to which fixed policies and established role 
responsibilities govern the interfirm relationship.  The three Likert-type items measuring this 
construct are derived from prior interfirm research (Dwyer and Welsh 1985; Reve 1986). 
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 Opportunism.  Opportunism refers to self-interest seeking behavior characterized by calculated 
efforts to mislead and confuse trading partners (Williamson 1985).  A two-item Likert-type scale 
was constructed from prior operationalizations by Anderson (1988) and John (1984). 
Construct Validity 
 
 The two-step approach developed by Anderson and Gerbing (1982, 1988) was employed to 
assess the factor structure of the measures and theoretical relationships.  This procedure affords 
the opportunity to assess the factor structure across populations and also facilitates the assessment 
of commonalities in structural parameters for multiple samples (Anderson 1987).  The items were 
subjected to confirmatory factor analysis via EQS/Windows (Bentler and Wu 1993).  We confined 
our analysis to retailers that participated in the 1990 and 1994 surveys.  We estimated separate 
measurement models for the initial sample (n=117), and the follow-up study (n = 117).  No items 
were deleted on the basis of the confirmatory factor analyses. 
 We assessed discriminant validity by estimating a model with all measures set to load on 
the appropriate traits and allowing the traits to correlate.  This model was compared with a series 
of models in which intertrait correlation was set to unity.  In each case discriminability was 
evidenced by a statistically significant chi-square difference between the models.  For example, 
the test of discrimination between monitoring and maladaption costs is statistically significant 
for the initial sample (1990 (χ2(1) = 5.156, p < .05) and the follow-up study (χ2(1) = 6.296, p < 
.05). 
 We analyzed a series of models that examined the covariance structures between the 
initial and follow-up data sets (Bentler 1993).  The initial test examined whether the covariance 
matrices are equivalent.  Results of this test indicate that the null hypothesis (i.e., that the data 
sets are equivalent) should be rejected (χ2(171) = 224.046, p < .05)3.  We subsequently 
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 investigated whether the factor loadings for the initial and follow-up study were equivalent.  The 
results presented in the measurement appendix indicate that the factor loadings do not 
significantly vary between data sets.  The final invariance test for the measurement model 
indicates that the factor variance structures and covariances are equivalent (χ2(579) = 766.828, p 
< .05).  Together these validity assessments suggest that the data are of acceptable quality to test 
the hypotheses.  The correlation matrices and descriptive statistics are provided in Table 1. 
TESTS OF HYPOTHESES 
Analysis of the structural relationships was performed independently for the initial data set 
and the follow-up study.  In each case the Anderson and Gerbing (1988) decision framework was 
employed4.  This framework enables the researcher to compare the theoretical model with a series 
of alternative structural patterns ranging from the null model to a fully saturated model.  Our 
theoretical model is intended to reflect the mitigating role of opportunism characterized in 
Williamson’s (1985) transaction cost framework.  Thus, we treat opportunism as antecedent to 
transaction costs and control structures as determinants of opportunism.  By contrast, marketing 
control theory (Jaworski 1988; Ruekert et al. 1985) suggests that control structures can directly 
influence channel outcomes.  We compared our theoretical model with models that introduce a 
direct association between control structures and outcomes.  The theoretical model for the initial 
data set offers a relatively poor fit (χ2(126) = 156.604; p < .05; CFI = .950).  Sequential chi-square 
difference tests were employed to compare the explanatory power of this model to rival models5.  
These tests suggest inclusion of a path from cooperation to bargaining costs (χ2(1) = 10.535; p < 
.05) and deletion of the path between cooperation and opportunism (χ2(1) = 0.119; p = n.s.) in the 
model for the initial data set.  Although the model that eliminates this second relationship is more 
parsimonious, the path is retained to facilitate invariance testing.  Sequential chi-square difference 
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 tests also indicate the inclusion of a path between cooperation and bargaining costs (χ2(1) = 
12.065; p < .05) and formalization and maladaption costs (χ2(1) = 7.395; p < .05) in the model of 
the 1994 data set.  The modified models provide more acceptable fit statistics for the initial 
(χ2(125) = 146.069; p > .05; CFI = .965) and follow-up data sets (χ2(124) = 143.987; p > .05; CFI 
= .976).  The model parameters are provided in Table 2.  
____________________________________ 
 
Tables 1 & 2 about here. 
____________________________________ 
 
 H1-H3 addressed the influence of opportunism on ex post transaction costs.  Opportunism 
increases bargaining costs in the 1990 sample (β14 = .544, T = 3.939, p < .05) as well as in the 1994 
sample (β14 = .503, T = 3.672 p < .05).  Thus, H1 is supported.  H2 is also supported given that 
opportunism raises monitoring costs in the initial (β24 = .449, T = 2.993, p < .05), and the follow-up 
studies (β24 = .406, T = 2.809, p < .05).  Consistent with H3, opportunism influences maladaption 
costs in the 1990 (β34 = .491, T = 3.825, p < .05) and 1994 samples (β34 = .305, T = 2.330, p < .05). 
The theoretical model was developed under the assumption that opportunism mediates the 
relationship between control structures and transaction costs.  Nevertheless, interfirm cooperation 
lowers bargaining (H1’) in the initial (β = - .363, T = -3.238, p < .05) and follow-up studies (β = - 
.412, T = -3.695, p < .05).  Cooperative interaction evidently enables trading partners to establish 
dialogue.  As a result, contingencies are expressed, and less time is dedicated to negotiations.  
Formalization also has a direct effect on maladaption costs (H3’) in the follow-up study (β = - .344, 
T = -2.679, p < .05).  Prescribed role responsibilities seem to underscore the importance of timely 
communication and result in lower costs to decipher corporate communications. 
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 H4 suggested that control structures reduce opportunism.  Cooperation lowers opportunism in 
the follow-up sample (γ41 = - .339, T = -2.919, p < .05), yet it does not influence opportunism in the 
initial study (γ41 = .042, T = 0.278, p < .05).  By contrast, formalization constrains opportunism for 
the initial (γ42 = - .722, T = -3.108, p < .05) and follow-up studies (γ42 = - .349, T = -2.663, p < .05). 
The temporal constraints on the theoretical relationships were analyzed in a model that 
constrained common regression paths between the 1990 and 1994 covariance matrices (cf. 
Anderson and Narus 1990).  Consistent with H5-H7, opportunism has an invariant influence on 
bargaining (χ2 = 0.377, d .f. = 1; p > .05), monitoring (χ2 = 0.063, d .f. = 1; p > .05), and 
maladaption costs (χ2 = 0.051, d .f. 1; p > .05).  Although the influence of cooperation on 
opportunism is not significant in both phases of data collection, the two estimates are statistically 
invariant (χ2 = 1.394, d .f. = 1; p > .05).  The influence of formalization on opportunism is 
consistently negative throughout the analysis (χ2 = 1.138, d .f. = 1; p > .05).  Thus, H8a and H8b 
are supported.  In addition, the negative influence of interfirm cooperation on bargaining costs is 
invariant across samples (χ2 = 0.111, d .f. = 1; p > .05)6.   
DISCUSSION 
 
Implications for Interorganizational Research 
Transaction cost analysis presumes that specific assets raise the prospect of opportunism, and 
it is this heightened prospect that raises transaction costs (Demsetz 1993).  Although this relationship 
is a fundamental premise of transaction cost theory, transaction costs have rarely been the focus of 
research (Milgrom and Roberts 1991).  Masten et al. (1991) offer evidence to suggest that operational 
costs vary with the form of exchange, and Agarwal and Lal (1995) indicate that monitoring costs 
influence the frequency of monitoring franchises.  Our study augments these efforts by providing 
empirically tested measures of multiple facets of transaction costs.  Moreover, we provide evidence 
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 that opportunism has a lingering effect on transaction costs, and we illustrate how formalized 
procedures can be employed to reduce opportunism.  Recent critiques of transaction cost analysis 
(e.g., Ghoshal and Moran 1996) question whether control mechanisms constrain opportunistic 
inclinations.  By contrast, we indicate that organizational structures can lower opportunism.  
Importantly, we suggest that it is the nature of the structure— and not merely structure itself— that 
leads to desired channel behaviors.  Formal policies evidently have greater merit when they outline 
the distribution of tasks as well as operating procedures.  The implication is not to abandon research 
that addresses organizational attempts to constrain opportunism.  On the contrary, research should 
seek to refine our understanding of organizational properties that foster productive interfirm 
alliances. 
Williamson’s (1996a) presentation of transaction cost analysis frames opportunism as a 
self-interest seeking behavior that mitigates efforts to influence organizational outcomes.  Our 
treatment of formalization is supportive of transaction cost predictions, yet it also suggests a direct 
relationship between formalization and maladaption costs.  The findings also indicate a direct 
relationship between cooperation and bargaining costs that is not mitigated by opportunism.  This 
relationship is consistent with control perspectives (e.g. Dalton and Lawrence 1971) linking 
informal controls to organizational outcomes.  These results underscore the need to augment 
transaction cost research with rationale from related theories.  Integration of transaction cost logic 
with complementary perspectives should be informative to interfirm research and management. 
Our study underscores the benefits of longitudinal research in an interorganizational setting.  
In conjunction with the decision framework developed by Anderson and Gerbing (1988), the 
approach enables the researcher to assess rival hypotheses and relationships unspecified in the 
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 theoretical model.  This approach should be incorporated into future studies seeking to gain an 
understanding of the development of interorganizational relationships. 
Managerial Implications 
 Although the context of our research limits the generalizability of the findings, our study 
underscores some practices that management should consider when assessing interfirm 
productivity.  We identify two control factors that management can use to hold opportunism in 
check and lower transaction costs.  First, management should assess the extent of interfirm 
cooperation.  Franchise partners that work together to plan promotional campaigns and upgrade 
store facilities are likely to develop mutual goals (Anderson 1988).  As a consequence of 
complementary goals, less effort is required to negotiate agreements.  The second control factor 
that should be assessed is the level of formalization.  As operating procedures become more 
precise in the designation of duties and responsibilities, channel partners become more aware of 
their obligations and those of their partners.  Specification of expected behaviors fosters 
performance of prescribed activities and lowers opportunism.  Thus, the management of 
franchised systems should continually audit the level of cooperation and formalization operating 
in the channel.  As these factors increase, opportunistic inclinations and transaction costs are 
subdued.  
Limitations and Future Research 
Our use of multiple sample data collected over two periods offers advantages over 
monadic, static research.  Other designs, however, could enhance our study.  Tracking 
relationships between constructs over successive periods can augment the design.  Assessment of 
relationships in successive periods enables the researcher to identify whether policies 
implemented in the recent past influence current productivity (Gundlach and Cadotte 1994).  
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 Future research that treats the development of performance over successive periods should 
enable analysts to make policy recommendations with greater confidence. 
The need for longitudinal research is particularly acute in relationships prone to 
opportunism.  Most research focuses on the level of agent opportunism, but as the relationship 
evolves the franchisor has strong incentives to shirk obligations (cf. Lal 1990).  As the level of 
opportunism rises, the returns from the relationship fall below acceptable levels (Anderson and 
Narus 1984).  Consequently, one would anticipate high relationship mortality in such contexts.  
Time-series analyses should provide insight into the decline of channel relationships. 
 Our concentration on ex post transaction costs provides insight into factors that influence 
productivity.  Nevertheless, ex ante transaction costs and other facets of ex post transaction costs 
should be analyzed.  Williamson (1985, p. 21) maintains that ex ante efforts dedicated to the 
development of contracts should be considered in conjunction with efforts associated with 
ensuring the fulfillment of contracts.  Anderson and Weitz (1992) maintain that commitment to a 
relationship involves a willingness to make short-term sacrifices to maintain a long-term 
relationship, and they outline a number of factors that influence interorganizational commitment.  
Future research could augment our research by incorporating ex ante factors and commitment 
costs.  Analyses that use a broader set of transactional cost factors provide the opportunity for 
the researcher to gain a better understanding of limits to efficiency in interorganizational 
exchange.  
Our analysis should be augmented with a broader set of control mechanisms and with 
treatment of incentive structures.  Our study is tacit with respect to regulation of selection criteria 
and management training, yet these formal controls should also markedly influence channel 
outcomes (Jaworski 1988).  Our analysis of cooperation addresses one aspect of informal control, 
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but relational norms also influence performance (Heide and John 1992).  The influence of incentive 
structures on interfirm performance should also be evaluated (Milgrom and Roberts 1988).  
Although incentives tend to be rigid within a franchised system (Lafontaine and Kaufmann 1994), 
incentive structures are changed periodically in order to align agent and principal objectives.  
Research that simultaneously examines formal structures, informal controls, and incentives has 
potential to develop a more comprehensive theory of antecedents to transaction costs. 
The franchising setting provides insight into organizational efforts to control transaction 
costs, but this context also limits the generalizability of our findings.  Parallel wording of dyadic 
reports facilitated measure purification, but the empirical setting precluded data collection with 
multiple informants.  Consequently, the results do not afford the opportunity to isolate trait 
characteristics from other sources of variance (Kumar et al. 1993).  In addition, the form of control 
and the transaction costs are likely to vary between franchised systems and other networks.  Clearly, 
our findings should be validated through future work that considers a broader set of contracts. 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 The purpose of our study has been to gain an understanding of antecedents to transaction 
costs.  Using data collected in the Norwegian oil industry over a five-year period, we offered 
evidence that control mechanisms direct interorganizational behavior and transaction costs.  We 
underscored the pivotal role played by opportunistic behavior in the production of transaction 
costs, and we presented interfirm cooperation and formalization as mechanisms that reduce 
opportunism.  We hope that our study provides insight to managers of interorganizational 
networks and stimulates additional interfirm research. 
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MEASUREMENT APPENDIX 
     
 1990 1994 Invariance Tests 
SCALE ITEMS Modela Modela χ2 P value 
     
Interfirm cooperation     
We cooperate with the refiner to plan the future of the station. .845 .774 -- --b 
We cooperate with the refiner in local sales campaigns. .792 .886 0.483 .49 
We cooperate with the refiner to design market plans. .712 .921 1.132 .29 
We cooperate with the refiner when we design advertisements. .690 .750 0.008 .93 
The refiner helps us to plan or modernize the store. .384 .612 2.968 .09 
Formalization     
There is no clear distribution of tasks between us and the refiner (R). .558 .701 -- --b 
There are no clear routines for safety training for persons employed at our 
station (R). 
 
.315 
 
.654 
 
3.395 
 
.07 
In general, the information routines from the refiner are very unclear (R). .659 .712 1.283 .26 
Opportunism     
We have reason to believe that the company hides important information 
regarding our station. 
 
.731 
 
.721 
 
-- 
 
--b 
The company has not kept promises made when we entered the 
relationship. 
 
.736 
 
.742 
 
0.302 
 
.58 
Bargaining Costs     
Our meetings with the refiner’s representatives are very effective and 
systematic. (R) 
 
.747 
 
.802 
 
-- 
 
--b 
Both parties are always well prepared in the meetings with the refiner so 
that decisions can be made. (R) 
 
.746 
 
.656 
 
0.631 
 
.43 
Monitoring costs     
We use too much time to control quality and quantity of deliveries of 
gasoline. The time could be used to increase profitability of the station. 
 
.603 
 
.565 
 
-- 
 
--b 
We spend too much time on accounting that could be used to increase the 
profitability of the station. 
 
.684 
 
.671 
 
0.306 
 
.58 
We use too much time to control deliveries of mineral products from the 
company that instead could be used to improve profitability at the station. 
 
.605 
 
.826 
 
1.729 
 
.19 
Maladaption Costs     
The information form the refiner is often poorly formulated and difficult 
to understand. 
 
.780 
 
.782 
 
-- 
 
--b 
Important information from the company seldom comes at the right time. .694 .781 1.567 .21 
The information form the company is either incomplete or too voluminous 
to understand. 
 
.906 
 
.884 
 
0.495 
 
.48 
  
Summary Statistics
    
 χ2 141.838 142.005 771.914 
571 
.01 
.10 
.878 
 (d. f.) 120 120 
a – All factor loadings have T-values that exceed 2.0. p- value .08 .08 
b – These items are fixed for the purpose of scaling. RMSR .05 .05 
R – These items were reverse scored. CFI .964 .974 
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ENDNOTES 
1. Interfirm cooperation is synonymous with the construct Reve (1980) refers to as vertical interaction.  
Both constructs address the level of coordination in the development of marketing plans. 
2. A longer version of the manuscript can be obtained from the authors.  The longer version provides 
macro-market and market share statistics for the 1990-1994 pentad. 
3.  Rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that the data sets are not equivalent and should not be pooled for 
further analyses.  Consequently, composite analyses of the two data sets are not performed.   
4.  For the sake of parsimony, only the summary results from implementation of the Anderson and Gerbing 
(1988) decision framework are provided. 
5. Analyses of the incremental fit for other direct paths between independent and dependent variables are 
not significant.  In the initial model direct paths from cooperation to opportunism (χ2=0.071, p <.79), 
monitoring costs (χ2=0.034, p <.85), and maladaption costs (χ2=0.994, p <.32) are non-significant; nor are 
the paths linking formalization to bargaining (χ2=1.029, p <.31), monitoring (χ2=0.969, p <.32), or 
maladaption cost (χ2=1.599, p <.21).  In the follow-up model direct paths from cooperation to monitoring 
costs (χ2=0.538, p <.46)  and maladaption costs(χ2=0.626, p <.43)  are non-significant.  Finally, the 
influences of formalization on bargaining (χ2=0.104, p <.75) and monitoring costs (χ2=0.756, p <.39) are 
non-significant.  
6.  Nested chi-square difference tests were performed to compare two models to the invariance model in 
Table 2.  The first model assessed whether the factor residual variances and covariances were equivalent.  
The results (χ2(10) = 7.023, p > .05) indicate that none of the residual variances or covariances changed 
significantly.  The second model examined whether the error variances and covariances were equivalent. 
The nested chi-square difference test (χ2(18) = 58.727, p < .05) identifies significant changes in the error 
variances for the three formalization measures and the second and third cooperation measures.  
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Table 1 
Correlations Among Constructs 
  Me  n Standa              
  Deviat             
   1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 
1. Cooperation 3.93 1.25  80            
2. Formalization 4.50 1.32  31  63           
3. Opportunism 3.06 1.48 -24 -45  70          
4. Bargaining Cost 3.95 1.34 -44 -27  46  72         
5. Monitoring Cost 3.31 1.42 -13 -28  36  25  70        
6. Maladaption Cost 3.72 1.32 -18 -26  36  26  24  83       
7. Cooperation 3.50 1.39  46  15 -13 -23 -04 -14  88      
8. Formalization 5.01 1.32  10  34 -30 -07 -16 -29  17  73     
9. Opportunism 3.79 1.75 -10 -32  44  32  33  20 -28 -29  78    
10. Bargaining Cost 3.91 1.30 -32 -22  25  44  05  19 -52 -23  37  65   
11. Monitoring Cost 3.32 1.48 -13 -23  30  22  36  19 -09 -16  32  14  72  
12. Maladaption Cost 3.47 1.33 -09 -26  34  19  15  46 -20 -36  25  36  23  85 
 
Correlations are in hundredths with decimal places omitted. 
Correlations greater than .18 have p values < .05. 
Reliability estimates are provided on the diagonals.  
a -  Items 1-6 refer to the initial study, and items 7-12 refer to the follow-up study. 
      
  
Table 2 
 
Parameter Values for the Structural Equation Model 
 
Hypothesis Proposed Path Parameter Estimates Invariance Tests 
  Initial Data Follow-up Data     
  Parameter T-values Parameter T-values χ2 p-values 
H1 Opportunism to bargaining costs .544 3.939 .503 3.672 0.377 .54 
        
H2 Opportunism to monitoring costs .449 2.993 .406 2.809 0.063 .80 
        
H3 Opportunism to maladaption costs .491 3.825 .305 2.330 0.051 .82 
        
H4a Cooperation to opportunism .042 0.278 -.339 -2.919 1.394 .24 
        
H4b Formalization to opportunism -.722 -3.108 -.349 -2.663 1.138 .29 
        
H1’ Cooperation to bargaining costs -.363 -3.238 -.412 -3.695 0.111 .74 
        
H3’ Formalization to maladaption costs -- -- -.344 -2.679 -- -- 
  
Summary Statistics 
      
 χ 2 146.069 143.987 735.582 
 d. f. 125 124 582 
 p value .10 .11 .01 
 AGFI .958 .971 .899 
 CFI .965 .976 .907 
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Figure 1 
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